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GOVERNMENT'S MISUSE OF COMPETITION
LAWS: DISCUSSING THE TELECOM
ITALIA CASE IN ARGENTINA
FMlix E. Mezzanotte*
ABSTRACT
An increasing number of countries around the world have enacted com-
petition laws on the premise that competitive markets can deliver substan-
tial benefits to their economies. But there are risks, for these very laws can
be used not to protect but rather to suppress competition. The goal of this
article is to illustrate how governments can misuse competition laws. To
this effect, I discuss the Telecom Italia case. In this case, the Argentine
Competition Authority (CNDC) investigated a foreign transaction by
which Telef6nica de Esparia indirectly acquired shares in Telecom Italia.
Although this transaction had taken place in Europe, it nonetheless created
competition concerns in Argentina because these two telecoms operated as
major rivals in the Argentine telecommunications market. The CNDC
found that this deal was a concentration that lessened competition and
made its approval conditional on Telecom Italia divesting all of its assets in
the relevant markets. I argue that the CNDC's decision was arbitrary and
inclined to discriminate against Telecom Italia and in favor of local inves-
tors. This article shows how easily disingenuous politics can derail the en-
forcement of competition laws and why competition authorities ought to
function independently and under strict judicial control.
I. INTRODUCTIONA N increasing number of countries are adopting a regime of com-
petition. In the 1980s, about forty countries had competition
laws and agencies in charge of enforcing such laws; today this
number is at least a hundred.' Most of this expansion took place as coun-
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rations, Market Structure & Competition Policy, 189, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/
IIT/5, U.N. Sales No. E.97.Il.D.10 (1997); Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust
Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and
Their Effects, 74 ANIITRusTr L. J. 271, 272-73, 315 (2007); Mark R.A. Palim, The
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tries underwent economic reform and recognized the benefits of competi-
tion.2 A competition regime sets a level playing field upon which firms
can surpass each other in the race for more clients, sales, and profits. This
market rivalry creates efficiencies that feed into the economy and benefit
society and consumers with better deals and more choices.3 Competition
laws protect this process by punishing conduct that harms competition.
In the context of globalization, these laws restrict the conduct of not only
local firms but also multinational firms operating in domestic economies.4
But a competition regime may fall short of its promises and may work
ineffectively.5 Moreover, firms that want to protect their rents may de-
ploy competition laws as a tool to subvert competition. 6 They may want
to stop a more efficient rival from pricing lower by accusing it of preda-
tory conduct; or challenge as anticompetitive a merger that brings in vast
efficiencies because it threatens to diminish their rents.7 Governments
can also misuse competition laws to control prices or-acting alone or in
collusion with friendly business groups-to protect vested interests.8 The
goal of this article is to illustrate some misconduct by government in en-
forcing competition law. More particularly, I will discuss the recent
Telecom Italia case in Argentina as an example of how a government can
utilize competition laws to protect not competition, but competitors
instead.
In this case, the Argentine Competition Commission (CNDC) investi-
gated a foreign transaction by which Telef6nica de Espafia indirectly ac-
quired shares in Telecom Italia.9 Although this transaction took place in
Europe, the CNDC worried that it could affect competition locally be-
cause these two telecom operators were rivals in the Argentine telecom-
munications market.' 0 The CNDC deemed this transaction to be a
concentration, found that it restricted competition, and made its approval
conditional on Telecom Italia divesting all its assets in this market." As I
2. Patim, supra note 1, at 111.
3. MAssIMo MOrr'A, COMPE TION POICY: TiiEORY AND PRAcGrici 25, 26, 30, 51
(2004).
4. PETEIR T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAw 411 (1997);
JosEPi E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 199-203 (2006).
5. Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer
Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, 17(4) J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3-4, 13, 23 (2003); Hyl-
ton & Deng, supra note 1, at 315.
6. Crandall & Winston, supra note 5, at 23.
7. William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition,
28 J. L. & ECON. 247, 247-48 (1985); Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper,
Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 Mici. L. RIv. 551, 591-
596 (1991).
8. Palim, supra note 1, at 139-41.
9. Ministerio de Economfa y Finanzas Ptiblicas, Telefdnica de Espafia Olimpia y
Otros s/ Diligencia Preliminar Art. 8 De La Ley 25.156, 1-42, available at http://
www.iprofesional.com/notas/76987-Resolucion-Telefonica-de-Espana.htm [here-
inafter Telefdnica de Espafla].
10. Id.
11. Id. at 39-42; Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas Piblicas, Dictamen 744 of 25
Aug. 2009, $$ 74-75, available at http://www.cndc.gov.ar/dictamenes/
dictamentelefonica-telecom.pdf.
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will argue, however, the arbitrariness of the CNDC's decision is so appar-
ent that suspicions of discrimination against Telecom Italia (a foreign in-
vestor) in favor of local investors are inevitable.
Section B of this article presents the facts of the Telecom Italia case,
while sections C and D outline the relevant CNDC decisions and court
ruling. Section E offers a critical discussion of the case. It identifies the
errors made by the CNDC and uncovers possible political motivations
driving the outcome of this case. In conclusion, this article warns us that
a policy of competition is far less likely to meet its conventional objec-
tives when politicians dismiss the rigorous enforcement of competition
laws and competition agencies fall prey to this political influence.
II. THE TELECOM CASE: FACTS AND PROBLEM
OF COMPETITION
In May 2007, Telco S.p.A. (the buyer) purchased the firm Olimpia
S.p.A from Pirelli & C. S.p.A., Sintonia S.p.A y Sintonia S.A. (the sell-
ers). 12 Both the buyer and seller were Italian firms, and the transaction
("the Telco transaction") took place in Italy.13
The Telco transaction is relevant to competition because it created a
close relationship between two major rival telecoms, namely Telecom Ita-
lia (TI) and Telef6nica de Espafia S.A (TE). It did so because TE owns
42.3% of Telco. 14 Telco purchased Olimpia, which owned shares in TI
(Telco ended up holding a total of 24.5% of the shares with voting rights
in TI).' 5 Therefore, through the Telco transaction TE gained influence in
TI.
Although the European Commission found no reason to intervene,
other competition authorities-notably those in Brazil and Argentina,
where TE and TI are sizable market players, and rivals-found sufficient
reasons to act.16 We will concentrate on how the Telco transaction af-
fected competition in the telecommunications market in Argentina.
Two features define the problem of competition in the Argentine tele-
communications market. The first one is that TE is of itself a strong actor
in this market where it operates through its subsidiaries including
Telef6nica de Argentina S.A. (fixed phone and internet) and Telef6nica
M6viles Argentina S.A. (mobile phones), among other local firms (for
the purpose of simplicity I will denote the group of subsidiaries of TE in
12. Telefdnica de Espadia, supra note 9, at 1-4.
13. Ministerio de Economfa y Finanzas Ptiblicas, supra note 11, 11 1-75; Telefdnica de
Espaia, supra note 9, at 1-42.
14. Five firms hold shares in Telco: Intesa SanPaolo S.p.A (10.6%); Mediobanca
S.p.A. (10.60%); Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A (28.1 %); Sintonia S.p.A (8.4%); and
Telef6nica S.A. (43.2%). Ministerio de Economfa y Finanzas Ptiblicas, supra note
11, TT 6,52.
15. Id. $1 1-5.
16. Marco Botta, Multi-Jurisdiction Mergers and Acquisitions in an Era of Globalisa-
tion: The Telecom Italia-Telef6nica Case, 1 GLOBAL ANTITRUST REV. 97, 102-116
(2008).
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Argentina as TELA).17 The second feature is that TE not only controls
TELA but also gained influence, through the Telco transaction, in
TELA's major competitor in Argentina, which is Telecom Argentina S.A.
(TA). 8
TI owns 50% of the shares in the Argentine holding company Sofora
Telecomunicaciones S.A (TI owns 32.5% of the shares directly and the
other 17.5% indirectly through Telecom International N.V. [TIN]); and
Sofora indirectly controls TA, which is a major player in the telecommu-
nication market (Sofora owns 67.78% of Nortel Inversora S.A., which in
turn holds 64.74% of shares in TA). 19 In brief, TE, through Telco and
Telco's purchase of Olimpia, acquired influence in both TI and TA.
This dual position of TE (controlling TELA and influencing TA) wor-
ried the CNDC, which decided to investigate to what extent the Telco
transaction could lessen the competition between TELA and TA.2 0
III. THE INVESTIGATION BY THE COMPETITION
COMMISSION OF ARGENTINA (CNDC)
After the Telco transaction became public, the CNDC started a prelim-
inary investigation in order to find out whether the transaction was a con-
centration and whether the parties were obligated to notify the CNDC
under Article 6 and Article 8 of the Argentine Competition Act (LDC). 21
In Decision CNDC 4/09 it concluded that the acquisition by Telco of 100
percent of the shares in Olimpia constituted an economic concentration
pursuant to Article 6(c) of the LDC because it caused a change of control
in both TI and TA. 2 2 It also ordered notification insofar as the turnover
of the merging firms was sufficiently high and because no exceptions to
the notification requirement applied.23
The parties to the Telco transaction disagreed with the CNDC's find-
ings. They argued that the transaction was not a concentration under the
LDC and, to this extent, that the CNDC could not restrict it using the
merger regime nor could it sanction the parties for failing to notify.2 4 On
this basis, they challenged the Decision CNDC 4/09 before the Court of
Appeals (Cimara Nacional en lo Civil y Comercial Federal). 25 But the
CNDC paid little attention to this legal challenge-the resolution of
which is still pending as of June 2010-and moved to investigate the Telco
transaction's effects on competition using the legal rules that apply to
17. Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas PMblicas, supra note 11, $1 31-51.
18. Id.
19. Id. 11 63-71.
20. Id. 11 202-03.
21. Law No. 25156, Aug. 25, 1999, B.O. 5 (Arg.), available at http://www.calp.org.ar/
Instituc/Institutos/Consum/Ley% 2025156.doc.
22. Telef6nica de Espalia, supra note 9, at 143-47.
23. Id.
24. Ministerio de Economfa y Finanzas PMblicas, supra note 11, $1 187, 191, 192-94,
197, 200-03, 1021.
25. Id.
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concentrations. 26
In Decision CNDC 744, the CNDC concluded that the concentration, if
approved without conditions, would substantially lessen competition in
the relevant markets. 27 This finding drew from the information provided
by the parties through notification (that the CNDC ordered them to do in
Decision CNDC 4/09), interviews conducted by the CNDC, reports from
the Secretary of Communications (SECOM), and the CNDC's own eco-
nomic analysis.28 In the latter analysis, the CNDC followed ordinary pro-
cedures: it defined the relevant markets and then evaluated the levels of
market concentration, the conditions of market entry, and the possible
efficiencies that the concentration may introduce. 29
The CNDC found that the Telco transaction would increase market
concentration dramatically at both the retail and wholesale levels in Ar-
gentina. 30 It also found that TELA and TA would act as a single firm and
supply sixty-seven percent of all telecommunication services in the coun-
try. 31 In some individual markets they would acquire significant market
shares, such as in local fixed phone (90%), internet access (72%), na-
tional calls (58%), international calls (70%), mobile phones (64%) and
wholesale internet access (100%), among others. 32 It was also deter-
mined that new entry was unlikely due to high entry barriers33 and that
no clear efficiency gains would follow from the transaction. 34
On this basis, the CNDC concluded that the Telco transaction would
increase the market power of TELA and TA in Argentina significantly,
which may lead to abuse in the form of high prices and/or market foreclo-
sure.35 Yet the CNDC did not recommend a full rejection of the concen-
tration. Instead it advised the Secretary of Internal Commerce (SCI-the
government agency to which the CNDC belongs) to approve it with con-
ditions (pursuant to Article 13[b] LDC).36 More particularly, the SCI
would approve the merger only if TI and TIN divested all their assets in
Sofora within a one-year period.3 7 Only this measure, the CNDC con-
cluded, would assure that the pre-merger conditions of competition in the
relevant markets would remain post-merger.38
The SCI acted accordingly, and in decision SCI 483/09, it ordered TI
26. See Ministerio de Economfa y Finanzas Pblicas, supra note 11.
27. Id. 91 258-60.
28. Id. 91 257-1004.
29. Id.
30. Id. 1 286-954.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.11 955-93 (including economies of scale, high-investment costs, vertical integra-
tion, and essential facilities).
34. Id. 1 994-1003.
35. Id. $1 1004-18.
36. Id. 1 1043-44.
37. Id. $1 203-04.
38. Id.
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and TIN to divest their assets in Sofora.39 This decision generated a great
deal of controversy, and each of the parties to the Telco transaction, as
well as TI and TIN, decided to challenge it in court.
IV. COURT REVISION
On February 1, 2010, the Federal Court of Appeals for Economic
Crime annulled the Decision SCI 483/09 by a majority vote.40 The
judges, Hendler and Repetto, held that the CNDC's investigation vio-
lated the rights of TI and TIN to due process and defense.41 According
to these judges, the divestiture order amounted to a sanction depriving TI
and TIN of their property rights in Sofora.42 Such a grave measure, the
judges went on, was illegitimate, for the CNDC did not give TI and TIN
direct participation in the antitrust administrative proceedings; nor did
the CNDC explain why the divestiture order fell on TI and TIN when
these two firms played no role in the Telco transaction. 43
In the dissenting vote, Judge Bonz6n validated the actions of the
CNDC and the contested Decision SCI 483/09.44 The judge rejected the
notion that the CNDC violated the rights of TI and TIN to due process
and defense by arguing that the rules of procedures for concentrations
are less stringent than those governing the more general framework of
anticompetitive conduct. 45
Unlike the majority vote-that had annulled the decision on grounds
of procedure without entering to consider the substantive issues of com-
petition-Judge Bonz6n conducted an extensive evaluation of the effects
of the Telco transaction on competition and relied on it to confirm the
Decision CNDC 744.46 The judge deemed the order to divest against TI
and TIN as legitimate, adequate, and proportionate. 47
TE had committed in Article 5 of Telco's Shareholders Agreement that
its representatives, including its appointed directors in TI, would neither
vote nor participate in meetings discussing polices, management, or oper-
ations concerning the firms that TI controls directly or indirectly. By self-
limiting its conduct contractually, TE had sought to assure compliance
39. Interim Report at March 31, 2010, Tiziucom ITALIA, 87, (2010), http://firstquarter
201Oreport.telecomitalia.it/sites/all/files/telecoml q2009/InterimReportl Q201 0.
pdf.
40. Cimara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Penal Econ6mico de la Capital Federal
[CNPenal Econ6mico] [National Court of Economic Criminal Appeals of the Fed-
eral Capital: Court of Appeals in Economic Criminal Matters], 1/2/2010, "In-
cidente de Apelacion S.A. Y Otros Contra Resolucion Sci No 483/09 (En Autos
Principales: Pirelli & CS.P.A. Y Otros SfNotificacion Art. 8 Ley 25.156)" Fallos
(2010-10-12), available at http://www.cij.gov.ar/adj/fallos/0.782119001265296449.pdf
[hereinafter Incidente].
41. Id. § 3.1.
42. Id.
43. Id. $1 16-18.
44. Id. $$ 7-16.
45. Id. § 3.1.
46. Id. $$ 7-16.
47. Id.
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with competition laws. But Judge Bonz6n concluded that such clauses
were ineffective and could not defeat the fact that, as a result of the Telco
transaction, TE had gained control over TI and TA.4 8
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
A. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE ARGENTINE
COMPETITION LAW
The notion of extraterritoriality means that a State can apply and en-
force its own national law over foreign conduct, that is, conduct commit-
ted in another State.4 9 This concept is critical to our discussion, for in the
Telecom Italia case, the CNDC applied the LDC extraterritorially.50 Ac-
cording to Article 3 LDC, the scope of the LDC encompasses foreign
conduct that may reduce competition in the Argentine markets.5' Al-
though the Telco transaction was initiated and completed by firms in Eu-
rope, the CNDC concluded that the LDC governs it because this
transaction affected the local telecommunications market. 52
To this extent, the LDC adheres to the so-called 'effects doctrine.' This
doctrine was first adopted in U.S. antitrust law. 5 3 According to the For-
eign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, the Sherman Act does
not apply to foreign conduct unless such conduct has a "direct, substan-
tial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S. commerce. 5 4 In Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. California the U.S. Supreme Court said that the
Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce, and
did in fact produce, some substantial effect in the United States.55 The
U.S. enforcement agencies also consider international comity when eval-
uating the costs of taking jurisdiction, in the sense that they assess the
potential for conflict with foreign States.56 The principles above also ap-
ply to merger cases under the U.S. Clayton Act.57
Although both the LDC and the U.S. antitrust laws adopt the 'effects
doctrine', the former does it far more broadly. The LDC makes no refer-
ence to limiting factors that constrain the meaning of 'effects' such as
48. Id. § 3.2.3.
49. RicH]ARD WHISH, COMPFTrnON LAw 470-74 (6th ed. 2009).
50. Incidente, supra note 40, 1 4.
51. aw No. 25156, art. 3.
52. Telefdnica de Espafia, supra note 9, at 143-47.
53. David J. Bederman, Diversity and Permeability in Transnational Governance, 57
Emory L.J. 201, 222 (2007).
54. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, U.S. DFP'T OF
JUSTICE & FiD. TRADE COMM'N, § 3.12, (1995), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/internat.htm.
55. Id. § 3.11 (with respect to foreign import commerce).
56. Id. § 3.2.
57. Id. § 3.14 (with respect to foreign firms having or not having operations, assets
and/or subsidiaries in the United States); Diane P. Wood, Deputy Assistant Attor-
ney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, The 1995 Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations: An Introduction, Address at the ABA
Antitrust Section Spring Meeting, (C)(4), (Apr. 5, 1995), available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/01 66.pdf.
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'intended' or 'substantial;' nor does it account for the notion of comity.
Rather, the LDC refers only to 'potential effects.'58 It suffices that the
foreign conduct may produce effects in the national markets for the Ar-
gentine authorities and courts to gain jurisdiction.59
With this broad conception of the 'effects doctrine,' it is not surprising
that the Argentine court of appeals did not object to the CNDC applying
the LDC extraterritorially to this case.
B. LEGAL CHARACTERIZATION OF THE TELCO TRANSACTION:
CONCENTRATION VERSUS ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT
When looking at this case through the lens of competition law and
through the legal characterization of the Telco transaction, the question
of corporate control, namely to what extent TE controls Telco, TI, and
TA, plays a key role.
Consider first a situation where, as a result of the Telco transaction, TE
controls Telco, TI, and TA. Here, the Telco transaction is a concentration
under the LDC, and the CNDC will thus scrutinize it using merger law.
TELA and TA constitute one single firm (TE controlling both of them)
and rivalry between them disappears. This is worrisome from the vantage
point of competition because it leads to substantial market power and,
hence, greater potential for abusive conduct. Moreover, in assessing
mergers, the CNDC must comply with a less stringent set of rules of pro-
cedure when compared to the case of anticompetitive conduct.6 0
Consider now a situation in which the control (or substantial influence)
by Telco on TI and TA is absent or cannot be established sufficiently.
Here, the Telco transaction cannot be characterized as a concentration
under the LDC, and the CNDC can only scrutinize the effects of the
transaction in the local telecommunications market using the more gen-
eral rules of anticompetitive conduct.6 1 These rules apply regardless of
the question of control, use a different set of economic assumptions, and
require more stringent procedures.
They assume that TE, on the one side, and TI, on the other side, are
independent firms that may engage in collusive conduct. Here, the Telco
transaction can facilitate collusion between TELA and TA (if TE,
through Telco, acquires shares in TI, TE and TI can exchange sensitive
information more easily and in this way facilitate collusion between
TELA and TA). A more serious concern is that, following the Telco
transaction, TELA and TA may have effectively engaged in collusion
through secret agreements or concerted actions.
58. Law No. 25156, art. 3.
59. Id.
60. GermAn Coloma, iConcentraci6n Monop6lica o de Conglomerado?, LA LiY, Feb.
17, 2010, http://www.ucema.edu.ar/-gcoloma/telecom-italia.pdf. The topic can also
be discussed from the perspective of conglomerate mergers.
61. Antitrust Issues Involving Minority Shareholding and Interlocking Directorates,
ORG. oiF ECON. COOPERATION AN) Diev., 9-10, (2009), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/40/38/41774055.pdf; Botta, supra note 16, at 8-9.
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A finding of anticompetitive conduct entails illegal conduct and grave
sanctions may follow. For this reason, the legal proceedings dealing with
anticompetitive conduct afford strong protections to the parties in order
to ensure their rights to due process and defense. In addition, the compe-
tition authority must typically discharge a higher burden of proof to es-
tablish a violation of the law.
The analysis above suggests that the issue of corporate control matters
a great deal for the treatment and resolution of the Telecom Italia case
under the LDC. In the presence of control, the economic analysis as-
sumes that TELA and TA are a single firm; the legal characterization of
the Telco transaction is concentration; and less strict procedural rules ap-
ply. In the absence of control, or of sufficient proof of it, the economic
analysis assumes that TELA and TA are independent groups that can
eventually coordinate their conduct, instead of competing, by entering
into collusive agreements; the legal characterization of the transaction
may fall under the legal rules of anticompetitive conduct, and stricter pro-
cedural rules, which afford greater protection to the rights of the parties,
apply. Said this way, the problem is that this critical question of control
was very complex in this case and could not be clearly resolved.
As noted in section C of this article, the issue of corporate control has
proved highly controversial in this case. The Decision CNDC 4/09 de-
picts a chain of corporate control between TE, Telco, TI, and TA which
has been fiercely contested in court by all parties and remains, thus far,
unsettled pending a court ruling.62 With the key issue of corporate con-
trol being unresolved, one would have expected that the CNDC would
have decided to either stop the investigation until the court resolved this
issue or, in the alternative, continue the investigation using the rules of
anticompetitive conduct. Instead, the CNDC took neither of these steps.
It stuck to its position as set out in the Decision CNDC 4/09 and escalated
the investigation using the legal rules of concentration. 63
The CNDC's strategy was puzzling. The CNDC knew that the issue of
corporate control was critical as demonstrated by its analysis in the Deci-
sion CNDC 4/09.64 It also knew that its findings on this issue had created
a great deal of opposition and sparked a sour legal dispute.65 It was also
evident to the CNDC that an investigation built upon a disputed key fact
of control is more likely to end up in error. Nor could the CNDC have
ignored the fact that sanctioning TI, as the decision SCI 483/09 ultimately
did, for the actions of TE would appear arbitrary absent an undisputed
finding of control.
62. Incidente, supra note 40, § IV.
63. Id.
64. Telef6nica de Espafia, supra note 9, at 143-47.
65. See Shane Romig, Telecom Argentina Battle Gets Nasty as Top Shareholders Spar,
CELLULAR NiEws, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.cellular-news.com/story/33830.php;
see also Mary Lennighan, Latin America: Telco Troubles in Argentina, TOTAL
TELECOM, May 18, 2009, http://www.totaltele.com/view.aspx?ID=4 45710.
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The reasons why the CNDC acted the way it did are, therefore, not
obvious. As I will discuss in the next section, one plausible explanation is
that it was a deliberate strategy by the Argentine government directed at
forcing TI out of the Argentine telecommunication market for the benefit
of local rivals.
C. PROTECTING COMPETITORS INSTEAD OF COMPETITION
A widely cited principle in the literature is that competition law ought
to protect competition but not competitors. 66 In stark contrast with this
rule, there are reasons to believe that the investigation into the Telecom
Italia case was a deliberate attempt by the local government to protect
local firms from foreign rivals. More precisely, the government con-
ducted a dubious, if not abusive, enforcement of competition laws in an
effort to get TI to exit the market.
The Telecom Italia case emerged against the backdrop of an internal
fight between the two shareholders of Sofora, namely TI and the local
group Werthein de Argentina (each firm holding fifty percent of the
shares in Sofora). 67 TI owned a call option by which it could choose to
buy the whole of Werthein's participation in Sofora, and TI had publicly
announced that it wanted to exercise this option.68 But the CNDC's in-
vestigation into the Telco transaction frustrated TI's plans.
In December 2008, the CNDC blocked the exercise of TI's option to
buy pending its investigation into the competition effects of the Telco
transaction in Argentina. 69 In April 2009, the CNDC went further and
suspended the voting rights of TI's directors in TA. 7 0 All this created not
only tensions between TI and Werthein but also a great opportunity for
the latter to strengthen its position in Sofora and TA.
As some commentators reported, the troubles arising from the CNDC
investigation might have caused TI to sell its assets in Sofora volunta-
rily.71 Because TI did not sell, the CNDC ordered TI to divest its Argen-
tine assets on the basis of a breach of competition law.7 2 Eventually, TI's
exit would benefit both Werthein and the government.73 The former
could retain or even increase its share in Sofora, which continues to be a
66. Jennifer Jo Snider Smith, Competition and Transparency: What Works for Public
Procurement Reform, 38 Puu. CONr. L.J. 85, 112 (2008).
67. Shane Romig, Argentina's IRSA Says Bidding for Stake in Telecom Argentina,
ADVFN, May 26, 2010, http://www.advfn.com/nyse/StockNews.asp?stocknews=
IRS&article=42983411 &headline=argentinas-irsa-says-bidding-for-stake-in-
telecom-argentina.
68. Romig, supra note 65. It made economic sense for TI to exercise the call option.
Werthein's share in Sofora is worth an estimated $800 million, whereas the op-
tion's price was about $400 million (in U.S. dollars). Id.
69. Lennighan, supra note 65.
70. Id.
71. Romig, supra note 67.
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very profitable business. 7 4  The latter would benefit from having
Werthein and other friendly local investors as allies in its bid to gain polit-
ical muscle.75
It is not surprising then that Werthein watched closely and spurred on
the CNDC investigation, 76 efforts that the Argentine government sup-
ported.77 Two factors facilitated political maneuvering in this case. First,
the CNDC functions under the authority of the SCI, which is a highly
political agency. Second, the creation of an independent competition law
tribunal is long overdue.78
If viewed through the lens of political plot, the actions of the CNDC
make more sense. That the CNDC decided not to wait for a court resolu-
tion of the controversial question of corporate control may have been a
response to political pressure.
That the CNDC sanctioned TI using the law of concentration rather
than anticompetitive conduct, even when the legitimacy of using the for-
mer was not obvious but rather highly controversial, could be seen as a
functional way to achieve the government's goals. In the merger regime
the CNDC enjoys not only greater discretion, for procedures are less for-
mal and the standard of proof lower,7 9 but also extensive remedy powers
that include asset divestiture.
That the CNDC directed its power against TI for the conduct of TE
appears to be a deliberate attempt to drive TI out of the Argentine tele-
communications market. The CNDC's failure to notify TI during the ad-
ministrative process can only nourish this suspicion.80
In annulling the Decisions CNDC 744 y SCI 483/09, the national courts
protected the rights of TI.8 Yet following this judgment many specula-
tions emerged as to the future steps of TI in Argentina.
74. Note that Telecom Argentina is still a very profitable business. It reported a
46.2% increase in profits in 2009 compared to the previous year. Telecom Argen-
tina's Earnings Rose 46.2% in 2009, AMuIo, Mar. 10, 2010, http://www.ambito.
com/noticia.asp?id=511721&seccion=Empresas&fecha=10/03/2010.
75. Carlos Pagni, Kirchner va por Telecom (otra vez), LA NACION, May 10, 2010, http:/
/www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?notaid=1263118; Adrian Ventura, El nuevo
apriete K contra los medios privados, LA NACION, May 14, 2010, http://
www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota-id=1264480; Michael Casey, Telecom Argen-
tina Warns Telefonica of Potential Legal Action, CELLULAR NEws, Nov. 10, 2007,
http://www.cellular-news.com/story/27306.php; Coloma, supra note 60, at 10.
76. En la guerra por Telecom, Werthein acepta una leve tregua con los italianos, iEco,
Apr. 9, 2010, http://www.ieco.clarin.com/empresas/Telecom-Werthein-acepta-
tregua-italianos_0_120300020.html.
77. Romig, supra note 72; Romig, supra note 65.
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Given the frictions that this case created between TI and the local gov-
ernment, this favorable court judgment might not be sufficient for TI to
stay in the country. In this sense, reports had indicated that TI planned
to sell its assets in spite of winning this first legal battle as a way to avert
high political risk.82 Other reports suggested that TI and TE would soon
adopt a global business strategy and fully merge their businesses,83 a hy-
pothesis that would support the position of the Argentine government.
Yet recent events delivered an outcome that only a few could have antici-
pated. With the rumors of merger at a global scale between TI and TE
dissipating, and with the relationship between Werthein and the govern-
ment worsening, TI and Werthein struck a deal by which they agreed to
cease hostilities, reassume their partnership, reform the governance of
Sofora and TA, and withdraw existing legal disputes.84
This TI-Werthein deal was a significant first step towards resolving the
problem of competition because it set aside the obstacles of governance
and politics that have hindered an objective solution for so long. The
CNDC would finally validate this deal and approve the Telco transaction,
yet not before negotiating with TE, TI, and Werthein a number of mea-
sures meant to remedy existing competition concerns.85 Among others,
TE agreed not to participate in the making of decisions over Ti's assets in
Argentina, and to allow the CNDC to monitor this by gaining access to its
files and records in Europe.86 Moreover, while the TI-Werthein deal ena-
bled TI to augment its participation in Sofora to fifty-eight percent,
Werthein obtained the management of TA, which further curtails any
possible influence of TE in TI and TA.87
In light of the events and circumstances that influenced the Telecom
case all along the process, one could reasonably argue that this more reli-
able solution to the problem of competition would have not been possible
had the government not been forced to relinquish its political ambitions
over this case.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Telecom Italia case tells us that governments can profit from com-
petition laws to pursue goals other than fostering competition. More pre-
cisely, they can enforce these laws abusively in order to favor local
investors at the detriment of foreign ones. To this purpose, most compe-
tition authorities have powers to remedy concerns of competition order-
ing firms to divest assets. Remedies of this type are very powerful, and if
misused (i.e. through arbitrary actions), they can harm firms severely.
Institutionally, this case also reminds us that the independence of the
competition authority as well as the close judicial control of its decisions
matter. Absent these factors, the whole purpose of competition law and
policy may miscarry.
In a context of globalization, this article warns us that, although na-
tional competition laws can play a legitimate role in the global economy,
there can also be a downside. While the explosive expansion of competi-
tion laws worldwide can restrain the conduct of powerful multinational
firms operating in local economies, there is a danger that governments
may utilize these very laws to mistreat foreign investors.
194 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 17
